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1  ICTY delivers its final judgment and presents final 
report to the UN Security Council
1.1 The ICTY in historical, institutional and legal context
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
with its seat at The Hague, the Netherlands, was established in 1993 
by virtue of United Nations Security Council Resolution 827. The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber delivered this tribunal’s final decision on 
29 November 2017, in the case of Prosecutor v Jadranko Prlic, Bruno 
Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric & Berislav 
Pusic ICTY IT-04-74-A, (29 November 2017) (‘Prlic et al’). The historical 
moment was somewhat overshadowed by the dramatic suicide of one 
of the accused – Slobodan Praljak – who managed to smuggle poison 
into the courtroom, which he then drank in front of an international 
television audience while the appeal decision was read out by the 
President of the ICTY. The courtroom itself was declared a crime 
scene by the Dutch authorities, who investigated the incident in order 
to determine the nature of the lethal substance, and whether Praljak 
had any outside help in obtaining the suspected poison (for a report 
on the incident, see ‘Dutch probe under way into war criminal’s court 
suicide’ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 30 November 2017, available 
at https://www.rferl.org/a/un-war-crimes-court-yugoslavia-final-verdict/ 
28885760.html).
The lengthy appeal decision, published in three volumes and totalling 
more than 2000 pages, epitomises the work of a tribunal that was at 
once a criminal court, tasked, on the one hand, with the mandate to 
determine the individual criminal liability of those responsible for the 
atrocity crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide) 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and, on the other hand, doubling 
as a forum for the recording of an historical account of the conflict in 
the Balkans.
On the same day that the Appeals Chamber delivered the decision 
in Prlic et al, the President of the ICTY, Carmel Agius, sent the final 
progress report and assessment of the work of the ICTY to the President 
of the United Nations Security Council, the UN organ which created 
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the ICTY (‘Letter dated 29 November 2017 from the President of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’: UN Doc. S/2017/1001, 29 November 
2017). 
The aim of this note is not to assess the legacy of the ICTY in any 
detail. That legacy will be debated for many years to come. Suffice 
to note that while the ICTY was primarily a criminal court, it was 
also more than that. The ICTY was the first international criminal 
tribunal created since the post-Second World War Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals. The indictment for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in 1999 of a sitting president – Slobodan Miloševic of Serbia 
– cemented the ICTY’s status as Nuremberg’s heir and precursor to 
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The indictment 
of Miloševic confirmed the premise upon which the quest to end 
impunity for the most serious crimes under international law rests, 
namely the possibility to charge the most senior military and political 
leaders, including heads of state and government, with atrocity crimes. 
There is some support in political science research for the thesis that 
prosecutions of atrocity crimes are affecting the behaviour of political 
leaders; and trials may even have a deterrent effect (K Sikkink 
and HJ Kim ‘The justice cascade: The origins and effectiveness of 
prosecutions of human rights violations’ (2013) 9 Ann Rev Law & Soc 
Sci 9 269-285). A cursory review of current international affairs may 
suggest otherwise. Be that as it may, what we can say is that, from 
an international criminal law point of view, the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY certainly marked many milestones and helped to determine the 
legal contours of responsibility for the atrocity crimes committed in 
the states of the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY, then, had a normative 
impact in terms of the development of substantive and procedural 
international criminal law. And the jurisprudence of the ICTY also 
had secondary effects, notably in terms of institutional reforms in the 
states of the former Yugoslavia and in terms of public perceptions 
about the international criminal justice project in the Balkans (for 
detailed analysis, see K Bachmann, G Kemp and I Ristic International 
Criminal Tribunals and Domestic Change (2018)). 
The domestic impact of an international tribunal such as the ICTY 
should not be overstated or mischaracterised. One should be aware of 
the institutional and political conditions under which the tribunal came 
into existence. In addition, it is also necessary to take into account 
the broader international political context in which both the ICTY 
and the various domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia operated. 
Indeed, there is a clear nexus between the perceived domestic impact 
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of the ICTY in the Balkans and pressure applied by the international 
community (notably the United States and the European Union), 
especially in the context of war crimes trials by hybrid courts in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Domestic approaches to atrocity crime prosecutions 
can therefore to a significant degree be attributed to external political 
pressure and, to a lesser degree, as a result of the normative trickle-
down from the ICTY (Y Ronen ‘The impact of the ICTY on atrocity-
related prosecutions in the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2014) 3 
Penn State J Law & Internat’l Aff 113-160). 
Questions about the historical, normative, institutional and domestic 
impact of the ICTY will not be explored in detail here. Suffice to note a 
number of significant challenges, developments and contributions, as 
noted in the ICTY Final Progress Report presented to the UN Security 
Council. 
•	 The	 ICTY	had	 to	 start	 trials	without	 codified	 rules	 of	 evidence	
and procedure. Judges of the tribunal had to develop these rules. 
This unfortunate situation was avoided when the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court was adopted in 1998. Unlike 
the ICTY, the ICC benefit from a detailed set of codified rules of 
evidence and procedure (Progress Report at para [60]).
•	 The	jurisprudence	of	the	ICTY	extended	the	scope	of	international	
humanitarian law. Legal protections which apply in international 
armed conflict was thus extended to non-international armed 
conflicts. This has been an important development in substantive 
international criminal law (Progress Report at para [58]).
•	 Rather	surprisingly,	the	ICTY	was	the	first	international	tribunal	
ever to define the key concept of ‘armed conflict’. This concept is 
important for the criminalisation of the violations of international 
humanitarian law in the form of war crimes. The ICTY decision 
in Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1-T, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (2 October 1995)’, thus 
contributed to the development of international criminal law in 
order to bring it in line with the modern nature of armed conflict 
(Progress Report at para [58]).
•	 Although	it	was	the	ICTY’s	African	counterpart,	the	International	
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which delivered the first 
ground-breaking decision on the crime of genocide in Prosecutor 
v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, judgment, (2 September 1998), it should 
be noted that the ICTY also contributed substantially to the 
development of the crime of genocide, notably the element of 
‘protected and targeted groups’. The decision in Prosecutor v 
Krstic, IT-98-33-A, judgment, (19 April 2004) deserves special 
mention (Progress Report at para [58]).
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•	 The	 ICTY	 found	 in	 two	 important	decisions,	namely	Prosecutor 
v Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T, judgment, (22 February 2001), and 
Prosecutor v Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, judgment, (15 March 2002), that 
enslavement is a crime against humanity. The tribunal furthermore 
confirmed in these decisions that the prohibition against slavery is 
customary in nature (Progress Report at para [58]). 
•	 In	Prosecutor v Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, judgment, (10 December 
1998), the ICTY held that the crime of rape, when committed in 
the context of an armed conflict, may be prosecuted as a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions and as a violation of the laws 
and customs of war (Progress Report at para [58]).
•	 In	Prosecutor v Mucic et al, IT-96-21-T, judgment, (16 November 
1998) the ICTY held that the crime of rape may constitute torture 
(Progress Report at para [58]).
•	 In	addition	to	the	ICTY’s	jurisprudence	on	the	crime	of	rape	as	a	
crime under international law, the tribunal also held in Prosecutor 
v Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T, judgment, (22 February 2001) that 
sexual enslavement can constitute a crime against humanity 
(Progress Report at para [58]).
In terms of the ICTY’s more general role as fact-finder and recorder of 
the history of the conflict and atrocities in the Balkans, it is noted in 
the Progress Report (at para [62]) that,
‘Ultimately, while the Tribunal has not been able to provide justice to 
victims as fast as the international community, or indeed the Tribunal 
itself, would have wished, it has forged a new era of accountability, 
demonstrating that the concept of impunity no longer prevails and that 
even the most senior military and political leaders may be held to account. 
This is perhaps the Tribunal’s greatest achievement of all and thus its 
most fundamental legacy’. 
It is against this background, then, that this article turns to the ICTY’s 
last decision. The focus will be on one aspect only, namely the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber’s contribution to the development of the general 
part of international criminal law, in particular the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise. 
1.2  ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in Prlic et al, and the 
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise
It was noted above that the ICTY has made significant contributions 
to the development of both procedural and substantive international 
criminal law. One of the ICTY’s more controversial contributions 
concerns the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. This doctrine also 
featured in Prlic et al. The aim, for present purposes, is to focus on 
this one aspect of the Appeal Chamber’s decision, and to contextualise 
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it with reference to the ICTY’s contribution to the development of 
the general part of international criminal law. By way of conclusion 
this aspect of the ICTY’s decision will briefly be compared to the 
application of joint criminal enterprise before other international 
tribunals.
1.2.1  The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise: A judicial 
innovation 
Joint criminal enterprise, a distinct form of criminal liability, is a 
judicial innovation; a creation of the ICTY judges. See, for instance, 
Prosecutor v Tadic, appeals judgment, IT-94-1-A, (15 July 1999) at 
paras [185]-[234]. In essence, the basic form of joint criminal enterprise 
corresponds with what South African criminal lawyers will recognise 
as the doctrine of common purpose. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic 
held that participation in a common plan should be viewed as a form of 
‘committing’ under the ICTY Statute (Tadic at para [186]). The Appeals 
Chamber went further and formulated joint criminal enterprise (JCE) 
as three distinct modes of liability:
•	 JCE I: This form is based on a common purpose, where ‘all co-
defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the 
same criminal intention…even if each co-perpetrator carries out a 
different role within it’ (Tadic at para [196]). 
•	 JCE II: The systemic form of joint criminal enterprise is where 
‘the offences charged were alleged to have been committed by 
members of military or administrative units such as those running 
concentration camps; i.e. by groups of persons acting pursuant to 
a concerted plan’ (Tadic at para [202]). 
•	 JCE III: The final form of joint criminal enterprise ascribes individual 
criminal liability where there is ‘a common design to pursue one 
course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act 
which, while outside the common plan, is nevertheless a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common 
purpose’ (Tadic at para [204]). 
The establishment of joint criminal enterprise as a mode of liability 
was not welcomed by all. Criticisms were raised about the absence 
of a proper statutory or customary international law basis for this 
notion. Some commentators went so far as to label the creation of 
joint criminal enterprise by the ICTY as a ‘tremendous stain on the 
legacy of the Tribunal’ (MG Karnavas ‘The ICTY legacy: A defence 
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1.2.2  Joint criminal enterprise before the Appeals Chamber: 
Revision, reform, or reaffirmation? 
Did the Appeals Chamber in Prlic et al use the opportunity of the 
Tribunal’s last judgment to revisit the criticism of joint criminal enterprise 
as a mode of liability, and depart from the apparently settled ICTY 
jurisprudence, or was the Tadic decision and subsequent jurisprudence 
with respect to joint criminal enterprise simply applied and confirmed?
First, it is necessary to briefly note the findings of the Trial Chamber 
in Prlic et al. The salient facts were as follows: Between 1992 and 
1994 a number of crimes were committed in the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The areas where the crimes were committed were 
first claimed to be part of the Croatian community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Later the areas were claimed by an entity known as the 
Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The appellants served in various 
senior leadership positions in this entity. In January 1993 the situation 
escalated and a joint criminal enterprise was formed. The political 
aim underlying the enterprise was to create an ethnic Croatian entity 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This entity would ultimately facilitate 
the reunification of the Croatian people. There was one obstacle, 
though: the local Muslim population. A key objective of the joint 
criminal enterprise was therefore the domination by the Croats of the 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna through the ethnic cleansing of the local 
Muslim population. Criminal acts, including unlawful deportation, 
murder, sexual crimes, and destruction of property, were aimed at the 
Muslim population. The ICTY Trial Chamber held Prlic et al criminally 
responsible on the basis of the joint criminal enterprise for committing 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the 
laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity. They were 
accordingly convicted pursuant to s 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.
The Trial Chamber also found that, although certain of the established 
crimes did not form part of the initial common criminal plan, the 
appellants were nevertheless responsible for a number of these crimes, 
pursuant to JCE III (i.e. the extended form of joint criminal enterprise).
The appellants challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings concerning 
their individual criminal responsibility based on JCE I and III. The 
lengthy and detailed factual and legal analysis as set out in the Appeal 
Chamber’s decision will not be addressed in full here. Suffice to 
note the Appeal Chamber’s observations regarding the status of joint 
criminal enterprise (including the extended form thereof) as a mode 
of liability under international criminal law. The Appeals Chamber in 
Prlic et al stated as follows (at para [587]):
‘[It] is the settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal that the three forms of JCE, 
as forms of commission of a crime, have been established in customary 
international law since at least 1992. The Appeals Chamber has repeatedly 
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affirmed the relevant analysis in Tadic, which examined post-World War II 
war crimes cases extensively in concluding that joint criminal enterprise 
as a mode of criminal responsibility is firmly established in customary 
international law, and has recognised three forms of this mode of liability 
– JCE I, JCE II, and JCE III. The Appeals Chamber has also held that “the 
long and consistent stream of judicial decisions, international instruments, 
and domestic legislation in force at the time” provided “reasonable notice 
that committing an international crime on the basis of participating in a JCE 
incurs individual criminal liability”’. 
The question before the Appeals Chamber was whether the Tribunal 
could revisit and possibly depart from its earlier exposition of the 
meaning, scope and applicability of joint criminal enterprise as a mode 
of liability. The Appeals Chamber noted that it was possible to depart 
from previous decisions on matters of law. However, the Tribunal 
has formulated a strict test for such departures. A departure from a 
previous decision by the Appeals Chamber would only be justified if 
there were ‘cogent reasons’ to do so, and this entails the satisfactory 
presentation of ‘clear and compelling reasons’ (at para [588]). This 
would include a situation where a previous decision was made ‘on the 
basis of a wrong legal principle’, or where a decision was ‘wrongly 
decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill informed about 
the applicable law’ (at para [588]. 
In Prlic et al the Appeals Chamber found that the appellants have 
failed to provide the required ‘cogent reasons’ for the Appeals Chamber 
to depart from its previous decision on the meaning and scope of 
joint criminal enterprise (at para [589]). The Appeals Chamber thus 
concluded that joint criminal enterprise, including JCE III, ‘was firmly 
established under customary international law at the time of the 
relevant events’ (at para [591]). 
1.3  Do other international, internationalised and hybrid 
tribunals follow the ICTY’s approach regarding joint 
criminal enterprise as a mode of criminal liability?
It has been noted that the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in its very 
latest decision, has confirmed that joint criminal enterprise, including 
the extended form (JCE III), was established under customary 
international law, at least since 1992. This confirmation by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber cemented one of this tribunal’s most important (and 
most controversial) contributions to the development of the general 
part of international criminal law. A survey of the law and practice 
of other international, internationalised and hybrid tribunals reveal 
that the meaning, scope and application of joint criminal enterprise 
is still far from settled, despite the legacy of its creator, the ICTY. For 
instance, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), in Prosecutor v 
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Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, appeal judgment, SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 
2009), held that the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR correctly 
reflect customary international law, and joint criminal enterprise can 
therefore serve as a basis for criminal liability (at paras [400]-[402]; 
[475] and [485]). Diametrically opposed to that is the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decision by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC), which held, in ‘Public Decision on the Appeals against the 
Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)’, Case 
No 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, (20 May 2010), that JCE III was not 
recognised as a mode of criminal responsibility applicable to violations 
of international humanitarian law. This mode of liability can therefore 
not find application before the ECCC in regard to international crimes 
(at para [77]). And, finally, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) provides in art 25(3)(d) for liability based on 
contribution to a crime by a group acting with a common purpose. 
This, on the face of it, corresponds with joint criminal enterprise as 
developed by the ICTY. However, it is doubtful that art 25(3)(d) covers 
the full spectrum of joint criminal enterprise (I, II, and III). Indeed, 
ICC decisions thus far seem to regard art 25(3)(d) as constituting only a 
residual form of accessorial liability, and not joint criminal enterprise, 
and certainly not in its extended form (JCE III). See, for instance, 
The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), ‘Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, (29 January 
2007)’ (at paras [336] and [337]). 
In Prlic et al the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY essentially upheld its 
previous exposition and application of the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise. The ICTY has made an enormous contribution to the 
development of international criminal law. This is not to say that 
subsequent international criminal courts and tribunals, including the 
ICC, will uncritically apply the law as interpreted by the ICTY, as we 
have seen with reference to joint criminal enterprise. But it is certain 
that the ICTY’s considerable jurisprudence will not easily be ignored. 
2  ICC Appeals Chamber: Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
acquitted on appeal
On 8 June 2018 the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) delivered an important, consequential and also instantly 
controversial decision. Indeed, the fact that it was a divided Appeals 
Chamber which delivered the decision in The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute”’, Case No ICC-01/05-01/08 A, (8 June 2018), (‘Bemba’) 
is in itself significant and indicative of divergent views on not only 
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the merits of the appeal itself, but also about the role of the Appeals 
Chamber as a court of review and appeal. 
2.1 Procedural history of the Bemba case before the ICC
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (‘Bemba’/‘the appellant’) was the leader of 
a political movement called the Mouvement de Libération du Congo 
(MLC), which was based in the north-western region of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Bemba also served as the commander 
of the MLC’s military wing, the Armée de Libération du Congo (ALC). 
The MLC was not only active in the DRC, but also in the neighbouring 
Central African Republic (CAR) where the MLC intervened to support 
the incumbent President of CAR against a rebellion. The events relevant 
to the criminal charges against Bemba before the ICC occurred in the 
territory of the CAR between October 2002 and March 2003. 
On 21 March 2016 Bemba was convicted by the ICC Trial Chamber of 
crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and war crimes (murder, 
rape and pillaging) committed by the troops of the MLC in CAR.
Bemba appealed against these convictions, and raised six grounds 
of appeal, namely:
(i) There was a mistrial
(ii) The conviction exceeded the charges
(iii) The appellant is not liable as a superior
(iv) The necessary contextual elements of the relevant crimes were not 
established
(v) The Trial Chamber erred in its approach to identification evidence
(vi) Other procedural errors invalidated the conviction
The third ground – concerning command responsibility – formed 
a key part of Bemba’s strategy on appeal. In particular, Bemba 
submitted that he had not exercised effective control over the MLC 
troops in the CAR (where the alleged crimes were committed). He also 
submitted that the Trial Chamber was wrong to find that he had actual 
knowledge of the crimes committed by the MLC troops. Also, Bemba 
argued that the Trial Chamber wrongly held that he failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the MLC crimes from 
being committed. 
The majority of the Appeals Chamber (Van den Wyngaert, Eboe-
Osuji, and Morrison JJ) focussed on appeal grounds (ii) (the scope 
of the charges) and part of (iii) (the Trial Chamber’s finding that 
Bemba failed to prevent or suppress the MLC crimes) and held these 
aspects to be determinative of the outcome of the appeal (judgment at 
para [32]). The majority thus decided not to address the other grounds 
of appeal in the main judgment. Aspects of the remaining grounds of 
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appeal were, however, addressed in the separate opinion by judges 
Van den Wyngaert and Morrison, the separate concurring opinion by 
judge Eboe-Osuji, and the dissenting opinion by judges Monageng and 
Hofmanski.
For present purposes the focus will be on the second and third 
grounds of appeal, since these aspects were determinative of the 
outcome of the appeal. By way of conclusion some of the other issues 
raised in the main judgment as well as in the separate opinions will 
be noted, albeit briefly. 
2.2 The grounds of appeal
2.2.1  Ground of appeal (ii): ‘The conviction exceeded the 
charges’
A key part of Bemba’s argument on appeal was that the Trial Chamber, 
in its findings regarding the criminal acts constituting the convictions 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes (the ‘underlying criminal 
acts’) went beyond the parameters that were set when the charges 
against him were confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Bemba argued 
that, if a criminal act was not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
and absent a successful application to amend the charges, such an 
additional criminal act could not form part of the charges against him 
and could not be used as a basis for a conviction. It should be noted 
that it was not Bemba’s argument on appeal that he had not received 
sufficient notice of the allegations against him; only that the Trial 
Chamber’s decision went beyond the scope of the charges against him.
In order to decide this ground of appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
addressed two issues (at para [100]), namely (1) the scope of the 
conviction decision; and (2) whether the conviction decision exceeded 
the scope of the charges.
The Appeals Chamber noted that Bemba was convicted of the 
crimes as set out in the disposition of the Conviction Decision, namely 
(at para [101]): 
‘Guilty, under Article 28(a) of the Statute, as a person effectively acting as a 
military commander, of the crimes of: –
(a) Murder as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute;
(b) Murder as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute;
(c) Rape as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute;
(d) Rape as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute; and
(e) Pillaging as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute.’
The Appeals Chamber noted that the disposition of the Trial Chamber’s 
Conviction Decision was supplemented by further findings in order to 
provide more context. These findings referred to examples of crimes 
(murder, rape, and pillaging) committed in the entire region of the 
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CAR where the MLC soldiers were operating during October 2002 to 
March 2003. Crucially, the Appeals Chamber noted that, while these 
findings ‘provide more detail than the disposition, namely by defining, 
in broad terms, the time period and area of the crimes, as well as 
the affiliation of the direct perpetrators, important information is still 
missing’ (at para [103]). For instance, the Trial Chamber’s Conviction 
Decision failed to refer ‘to even an approximate number of the 
individual criminal acts of murder, rape and pillage found established’ 
(at para [103]). The majority of the Appeals Chamber also found that 
the Trial Chamber failed to demarcate the scope of the conviction in 
clear terms. The majority of the Appeals Chamber therefore concluded 
that the Trial Chamber’s broad disposition in the Conviction Decision 
did not reflect what Bemba was convicted of. The Trial Chamber’s 
disposition should therefore be seen as summaries of the findings 
in relation to the ‘criminal acts of murder, rape and pillage that…
[had been established] beyond reasonable doubt’ (at para [104]). Of 
course, Bemba’s conviction was entered in relation to the specific 
criminal acts, and the disconnect between the scope of the findings 
and the convictions therefore led the majority of the Appeals Chamber 
to conclude that the prosecutor was wrong when she submitted, at 
the time of the appeal hearing, that Bemba ‘was charged with, and 
convicted of, generally crimes of murder, rape and pillaging committed 
by MLC soldiers in the territory of the CAR from 26 October 2002 to 
15 March 2003, which constituted the “facts and circumstances” in the 
present case, and that the criminal acts were merely “subsidiary facts” 
or “evidence”, “used in this case to establish the material fact”’ (at para 
[104]). 
It is important to remember the central question raised by Bemba on 
appeal, namely, whether his conviction exceeded the charges against 
him. The relevant legal provision is art 74(2) of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, which provides that, ‘The decision [of the Trial Chamber at the 
end of the trial] shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described 
in the charges and any amendments to the charges’. After a review 
of all relevant materials and decisions (including the Confirmation of 
Charges Decision) and the Trial Chamber’s final decision, the majority 
of the Appeal Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber held Bemba 
criminally responsible for one murder, the rape of 20 persons and five 
acts of pillaging. These were the only criminal acts which were found 
to be within the scope of the charges (at para [118]). 
2.2.2 Ground of appeal (iii): ‘Command responsibility’
Ever since the post-Second World War trial of General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita by a US Military Commission in Manila in the Philippines, 
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the doctrine of command responsibility, which was established in the 
Yamashita prosecution, remained a controversial, yet crucial part of 
international criminal law and the effort to end impunity for the worst 
crimes under international law (G Mettraux The Law of Command 
Responsibility (2009) 5-12; C Meloni Command Responsibility in 
International Criminal Law (2010) 42-48). 
Regarding command responsibility as a basis for criminal liability 
under art 28(a) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber in Bemba held 
that a commander should take ‘all necessary and reasonable measures’ 
to prevent subordinates from committing atrocity crimes. According 
to the Trial Chamber, ‘all necessary and reasonable’ measures is a 
measure to be established on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, focussing on the 
‘material power’ of the commander (at para [121]). Considering all 
the evidence, the Trial Chamber held that Bemba had failed to take 
‘all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent 
or repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates during the 
2002-2003 CAR Operation, or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities’ (at para [136]). Regarding this finding by the Trial Chamber, 
it was noted by the Appeals Chamber that the Trial Chamber did not 
link Bemba’s ‘putative failure to take adequate measures to any of 
the specific criminal acts… which he was ultimately convicted of’ (at 
para [136]). 
The commander’s duty should not be analysed in the abstract; 
it should be done with reference to the concrete situation on the 
ground and with reference to the real powers and capabilities of the 
commander in question. It is not about what the commander ‘might 
theoretically have done’ (at para [170]). Indeed, the majority in the 
Bemba appeals judgment noted that the commander’s duty to take 
‘all necessary and reasonable measures’, is ‘intrinsically connected to 
the extent of a commander’s material ability to prevent or repress 
the commission of crimes or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution’ (at para [167]). This legal 
standard is also reflected in art 28 of the Rome Statute, which requires 
commanders to ‘do what is necessary and reasonable under the 
circumstances’ (at para [169]; emphasis as it appears in the judgment). 
It was noted above that Bemba was held responsible for only a 
limited number of crimes committed by his subordinates in CAR 
during 2002-2003. The Trial Chamber, however, apparently expected 
Bemba to have taken preventive and suppressive measures with respect 
to the much broader finding of widespread MLC criminality in the 
CAR. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber noted that Bemba was not 
sufficiently notified of all the preventive or suppressive measures which 
the Trial Chamber ultimately legally expected of him. For instance, 
the ‘Corrected Revised Second Amended Document Containing the 
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Charges’ ‘did not specifically identify the redeployment of troops as 
a necessary and reasonable measure’ that Bemba should have taken. 
And yet, the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on this measure when 
finding that Bemba ‘had failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures’ (at para [188]). The Appeals Chamber thus found that there 
were ‘serious errors in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of whether 
Bemba took all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or 
repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’ 
(at para [189]). In light of these serious errors by the Trial Chamber, 
the majority of the Appeals Chamber found that one of the elements 
of command responsibility under art 28(a) of the Rome Statute was 
not properly established. The majority of the Appeals Chamber thus 
concluded that Bemba could not be held criminally liable on the 
basis of command responsibility for the crimes committed by MLC 
troops during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation (at para [194]). As for 
the ‘underlying crimes’ for which Bemba was convicted (i.e. the one 
murder, the rape of 20 persons and five acts of pillaging) it was held 
by the majority of the Appeals Chamber that ‘the error identified in 
the Trial Chamber’s finding on necessary and reasonable measures’ 
extinguishes in full Bemba’s criminal liability for those crimes (at para 
[198]). 
2.3 The Appeals Chamber’s decision
The Appeals Chamber of the ICC reversed Bemba’s conviction and 
entered an acquittal with respect to all the charges. Article 81(3)(c) of 
the Rome Statute determines that in case of an acquittal, the acquitted 
person should be released from detention immediately. Since Bemba 
was also convicted of offences against the administration of justice by 
another Trial Chamber of the ICC, it was left to that chamber (Trial 
Chamber VII) to determine Bemba’s continued detention. On 12 June 
2018, Trial Chamber VII ordered his interim release under specific 
conditions. See, ‘Decision on Mr Bemba’s Application for Release’, 
ICC-01/05-01/13, (12 June 2018). He subsequently joined his family in 
Belgium, awaiting a final decision on his release. 
2.4 The Bemba appeal decision in critical perspective
2.4.1  A unanimous Appeals Chamber judgment is desirable, 
but not an absolute aim
The ICC has thus far rendered a relatively small number of judgments, 
and, excluding Bemba, only three full appeal judgments on the merits 
(i.e. not interlocutory matters). It is therefore tempting to label almost 
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every judgment by this Court as a ‘milestone’, or ‘pivotal’, or ‘historic’. 
It is perhaps better to avoid overenthusiastic characterisations of ICC 
decisions and to rather leave some room to identify the real historic 
or ground-breaking judgments when they come to pass. This author 
would submit that the Bemba appeals judgment is such a judgment, 
and worthy of recognition as a pivotal judgment, with even more 
pivotal separate opinions (at least as far as the future development of 
international criminal law is concerned). I also don’t share the dismay 
expressed by some commentators about the Appeals Chamber’s 
inability to achieve consensus in this case (see critical remarks by 
L Sadat ‘Fiddling while Rome burns? The Appeals Chamber’s curious 
decision in Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ EJILTALK: 
Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 12 June 2018, 
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome-burns-
the-appeals-chambers-curious-decision-in-prosecutor-v-jean-pierre-
bemba-gombo/ accessed on 11 July 2018). Sadat argues that the 
legal issues which featured in the Bemba appeal were unresolved, 
and it was therefore desirable that a unanimous Appeals Chamber 
pronounced on these matters in order to bring more clarity, order 
and authority. This point of critique is not very persuasive. The 
Rome Statute in art 83(4) provides for the possibility of a divided 
bench in appeal matters. International practice is also varied, and 
many domestic appeal courts as well as other international criminal 
tribunals provide for instances where consensus cannot be reached 
between the judges. Indeed, judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison 
have probably anticipated this critique, and have noted in their joint 
separate opinion, as follows: 
‘Although we regret that despite our best efforts, the judges in this Appeal 
have not been able to reach unanimity, we accept that it is a fact of 
judicial life that judges do not always agree. This is true for national 
courts and tribunals, and perhaps even more for international courts, 
where the panels consist of judges from different legal backgrounds who 
must interpret and apply a body of the law that is relatively new and 
often open to diverging approaches and views. The ICC statute is full of 
“constructive ambiguities” that have displaced the discussion from the 
political level (the drafters of the Rome Statute) to the judicial level (the 
judges of the ICC). Unsurprisingly, some of these discussions remain alive 
and explain why it is sometimes difficult to reach unanimity. The ICC is 
far from unique in this respect.’ 
(‘Separate opinion, Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Howard Morrison, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2-08-06-2018 1/34 EC A, 
at para [2]). 
168 SACJ . (2018) 1
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
2.4.2  The standard of review: Is the majority’s approach in 
Bemba an outlier, or a new standard for future appeal 
cases?
A crucial point of difference between the majority and the minority 
was the standard of review. It is clear from the minority’s ‘Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Sanji Monageng and Judge Pietr Hofmanski’, ICC-
01/05-01/08-3636-Anx1-Red 08-06-2018 1/269 EC A) that they have 
opted for the established standard of review adopted before ad hoc 
tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) as well as the ICC, namely that there should 
only be interference with a trial chamber’s factual findings where the 
Appeals Chamber ‘cannot discern how the Chamber’s conclusion could 
have reasonably been reached from the evidence before it’ (Dissenting 
Opinion at para [9]). The majority, however, departed from the 
minority’s apparent margin of deference to the Trial Chamber’s factual 
findings, and opted for a more comprehensive approach regarding 
interference in factual findings. The majority established the standard 
of review as a miscarriage of justice test; that is, an appeal chamber is 
allowed to interfere with a trial chamber’s factual findings if a failure 
to interfere would cause a miscarriage of justice in the broad sense 
of the word (Bemba judgement at para [38]; ‘Concurring Separate 
Opinion, Judge Eboe-Osuji’ ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx3 14-06-2018 
1/117 EC A, at para [72]). 
The appropriate standard of review is an important legal and 
institutional matter for the ICC. It is generally true that a trial court is 
normally in the best position to make factual findings. However, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC is more than just a court of appeal or 
review. Heinze has, correctly, pointed out that the Bemba majority’s 
broad approach to the standard of review should also be seen in light 
of the fact that the ICC Appeals Chamber is ‘the end of the road’ for 
any accused person before the ICC. There is no other court of review 
(for instance, a regional human rights court or a constitutional court) 
available for the convicted person (A Heinze, ‘Some reflections on 
the Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment’ Opinio Juris, 18 June 2018, 
accessed at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/06/18/some-reflections-on-
the-bemba-appeals-chamber-judgment/ (11 Jul 2018)). The Appeals 
Chamber of the ICC must therefore function as an ordinary court 
of appeal, in addition to a kind of constitutional court, aimed at the 
advancement and protection of the ICC’s fair trial and due process 
guarantees. The standard of review adopted by the majority in Bemba 
is a departure from international practice but should not be seen as 
an unacceptable outlier, to be ‘corrected’ by future appeal decisions. 
Indeed, I would suggest that the majority’s approach may quite 
defensibly become the new norm. 
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2.4.3 Other important issues
The Bemba Appeal Chamber judgment, together with the majority 
separate opinion (Van den Wyngaert and Morrison JJ), the concurring 
separate opinion (Eboe-Osuji J) and the dissenting opinion 
(Monageng and Hofmanski JJ) provide ample material for further 
debate and analysis. An in-depth discussion of any or all of the 
many procedural and substantive issues in Bemba falls outside the 
scope of this contribution. On the evidentiary and procedural front 
there is, for instance, the issue of the quality and sufficiency of the 
evidence that was admitted and used by the Trial Chamber to convict 
Bemba of the various crimes. Again, there appears to have been a 
sharp divergence of opinion between the majority and the minority. 
While the majority raised several concerns about evidentiary issues 
(including the admissibility and weight of hearsay and anonymous 
hearsay, the weight of unsworn statements, and the cumulative effect 
of circumstantial evidence) the minority were far less concerned about 
these issues (‘Separate opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert and Judge 
Morrison’, at paras [3]-[18]). 
Bemba’s acquittal by the Appeals Chamber does not mean that 
atrocity crimes were not committed in the CAR. The victims of the 
situation in the CAR can attest to that. Both the majority and minority 
opinions dealt with various issues surrounding the elements of crimes 
against humanity, notably the requirements of a widespread attack 
and of multiple commission, as well as the policy element. As with so 
many of the other legal and factual issues, the majority and the minority 
diverged in their findings as to whether the crimes committed in the 
CAR qualify as crimes against humanity, with the majority stating that 
the evidence did not support a finding of ‘widespread attack’ and of 
‘multiple commission’. They also found that the policy requirement 
for crimes against humanity was lacking (majority separate opinion 
at para [58]). The minority disagreed with this finding and stated 
in detail why they would characterise the crimes committed in the 
CAR as crimes against humanity (minority separate opinion at paras 
[489]-[552]). 
2.4.4 And what about the victims?
Bemba’s successful appeal means that victims of the atrocity crimes 
that were committed in the CAR during 2002-2003 are left without 
formal recourse in the form of victim reparations. However, on 
13  June 2018 the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims 
at the ICC informed the President of the Assembly of States Parties 
to the Rome Statute of the ICC that the Trust Fund will accelerate 
an assistance programme for the victims of the situation in the CAR. 
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The assistance will take the form of material and psychological support 
and rehabilitation for the benefit of the victims and their families 
(ICC media statement: ‘Following Mr Bemba’s acquittal, Trust Fund 
for Victims at the ICC decides to accelerate programmes in Central 
African Republic’ 13 June 2018, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/
Pages/item.aspx?name=180613-TFVPR accessed on 11 Jul 2018). 
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